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Ann Mettler 
From Junior Partner to Global Player? 
The New Transatlantic Agenda and Joint Action Plan  
Introduction 
Hailed by President Clinton as the “roadmap for the 21
st century”, the New 
Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) and the Joint Action Plan (JAP) were d e-
signed to be a watershed in US-EU relations.  
Rooted in the revolutionary changes of the late 1980s/early 1990s, the US 
and the EU realized that they were entering the uncertainty of a new and 
unprecedented political era - the post-Cold War world - which called for a 
fundamental overhaul of transatlantic relations. It quickly became obvious 
that the political dialogue between the two needed to be reinvigorated and 
incorporate a wider area of policy objectives. Ergo, it was necessary to 
move away from the ad hoc consultations common during the Cold War, 
and cope with issues which were formerly for the most part unilaterally 
dealt with by the United States.  
Only a few years after the first attempt of strengthening transatlantic ties 
culminated in the Transatlantic Declaration of 1990, policy makers on both 
sides of the Atlantic realized that further cooperation was called for. At the 
US-EU summit in Madrid on 3 December 1995, President Bill Clinton, 
Spanish Prime Minister and President of the EU Council Felipe Gonzalez, 
and European Commission President Jacques Santer announced a New 
Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) and a Joint Action Plan (JAP) to forge even 
closer ties between the United States and the European Union by imple-Ann Mettler 
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menting coordinated policies on a range  of the most pressing economic, 
political, security, humanitarian, environmental and cultural issues. 
The initiative was a concise plan laying out concrete action plans to cope 
with today's interdependent world in which challenges facing the United 
States and the European Union could no longer be dealt with satisfactorily 
by either party acting alone. Transnational in nature, these challenges, such 
as international crime, drug trafficking, terrorism, environmental degrada-
tion and the spread of communicable diseases, required resources which 
exceeded those at the disposal of either the US or the EU acting alone.
1 
In particular, the two sides promised joined actions to work towards the 
following four goals: 
(I)  promoting peace and stability and fostering democracy  and 
development around the world   
(II)  responding to new global challenges 
(III)  contributing to the expansion of world trade and closer eco-
nomic relations 
(IV)  building social and cultural bridges across the Atlantic 
Based on the Agenda, the Joint Action Plan is a more c omprehensive 
document which contains 150 longer-term specific objectives from which a 
number are selected for regular updating of the Agenda between subse-
quent US-EU summit meetings. 
The following assessment explores the origins of the Agenda in general and 
the overall state of transatlantic relations during the 1990's in particular. 
Furthermore, each policy area is discussed and evaluated from an American 
and European point of view. Lastly, potential points of friction are exam-
ined and a prospect for bringing the Agenda to fruition will be undertaken.  
 
 
1   Michael Lind, "Pax Atlantica: The Case for a Euroamerica," World Policy Journal 
Volume 13, No. 1, Spring 1996, p.6. The New Transatlantic Agenda and Joint Action Plan 
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The Beginning of the 1990's: Transatlantic Declaration - 
a First Step Towards Greater Cooperation 
As early as 1976, the US and the EC agreed to biannual meetings between 
the head of state or government of the country holding the Community's 
presidency and the US president. In the aftermath of serious disputes re-
garding East-West relations in the 1980's, annual meetings were arranged 
between Troika political directors and the Assistant Secretary of State for 
European Affairs. In addition, several ad hoc consultations b etween US 
cabinet members and their European counterparts took place on the mar-
gins of annual NATO summits in Brussels. 
The rapid changes which Europe underwent in the second half of the 1980's 
made evident that these kind of informal consultations would not suffice to 
successfully respond to the challenges ahead. The fact that the newly inde-
pendent Central and Eastern European states (CEE) would likely be first 
and foremost oriented towards the European Community proved distressing 
to the US. Concerned that the European integration process could develop 
policies and institutions antithetical to and incompatible with American 
interests, the US called for closer transatlantic cooperation in the hope of 
influencing European affairs in its favor: 
...we propose that the United States and the European Community 
work together to achieve, whether it is in treaty or some other form, 
a significantly strengthened set of institutional and consultative 
links.
2 
President Bush seconded Baker's initiative and approximately a year later, 
on 23 November 1990, their endeavor culminated in the Transatlantic Dec-
laration. Emphasizing the transatlantic attachment to common values, prin-
ciples and traditions, the Declaration foresaw the establishment of a 
mechanism for regular consultations between heads of state, foreign minis-
ters, other cabinet members, political directors and experts. The meetings 
were to take place in a bilateral (US administration and European Commis-
 
2   James Baker, "A New Europe, A New Atlanticism: Architecture for a New Era," 
Press Office of the Department of State, 12 December 1989. Ann Mettler 
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sion) or trilateral format (previous two plus EU Council presidency). In ad-
dition, the Declaration also formalized exchanges between the European 
Parliament and the US Congress.  
While ambitious and forward-looking in content, the Declaration proved 
inapt at m eeting its goals. The success of the summit meetings depended 
too heavily on subjective factors, such as the EU presidency country's 
commitment to advance US-EU relations or the personal chemistry b e-
tween policy makers. Moreover, the Declaration achieved m odest results 
because its design was unidirectional  - in the sense that consultations 
merely consisted of briefings by US participants to their European counter-
parts - and therefore lacked the necessary synergy and European input.  
Realizing the inherent deficiencies of the Declaration and fearing a subse-
quent shift of US attention towards Asia
3, the German Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl proposed a further deepening of transatlantic relations. His efforts 
resonated with policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic and resulted in 
the launch of three "working groups" at the US-EU summit in July 1994 in 
Berlin. The groups were to focus on these areas:  International Crime, i n-
cluding drug trafficking, nuclear smuggling and money laundering;  Com-
mon Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP), particularly the means of i m-
proving coordination of humanitarian assistance to the developing world; 
and Central and Eastern Europe(CEE), particularly the means of improving 
coordination and technical assistance programs for market reform. 
While the third group achieved at least modest results, the other two found 
themselves hampered by the three-pillar structure of the EU. The working 
group on international crime encountered the vehement opposition of nu-
merous EU member states who claimed that the issue fell under the third 
pillar of the Maastricht Treaty and was thus to be treated on an intergov-
ernmental basis. The same held true for the CFSP working group. In both 
instances, the member states feared that granting the Commission a role in 
issues falling under the intergovernmental pillars of the Union (pillar II and 
 
3   Roger Altmann, Charles A. Kupchan, "Arresting the Decline of Europe," World 
Policy Journal, Volume 14, No. 4, 1997/98, p.1. The New Transatlantic Agenda and Joint Action Plan 
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III) could result in a transfer of competences to Brussels and a subsequent 
loss of sovereignty.
4  
In retrospect, the three working groups may best be described as the trial 
stage f or a more coherent and substantive cooperation effort. Both sides 
realized that is was necessary to "add flesh to the bones of the Transatlantic 
Declaration"
5, and to move away from mere consultation towards joint ac-
tion. The urgency of the issue was not only reinforced by the shortcomings 
of the Transatlantic Declaration but also by the concomitantly occurring 
political and economic disparities between the United States and Europe. 
1990-1995: Two Powers in Danger of Drifting Apart 
In the post-Cold War world it became increasingly evident that both sides 
were in danger of drifting apart. On the one hand, policy makers were 
overly occupied with domestic issues, while international actors were for 
the most part restricted to areas of geographical proximity or strategic i n-
terest. Severely curtailed public budgets further exacerbated this situation 
and forced policy makers to focus primarily on issues of tangible benefits.  
On the security front, there was a sense that NATO - the premier forum for 
transatlantic c onsultations  - had fulfilled its mission after defeating the 
communist menace. In other words, Washington's security guarantee was 
no longer needed, and a withdrawal of the only remaining superpower from 
European security affairs appeared imminent. This concern was vividly ex-
pressed by the Belgian Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene: 
The Cold War is over now. Very fortunately so, but at the 
same time...we have been deprived of an enemy. The glue 
which kept us together for so long, has lost its strength.
6   
 
4   Michael Calingaert,  European Integration Revisited: Progress, Prospects and US 
Interests, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1996, p. 183. 
5   Christoph Bail/Wolfgang Reinicke/Reinhardt Rummel, "The New Transatlantic 
Agenda and the EU-US Joint Action Plan: An Assessment", in  EU-US Relations: 
Balancing the Partnership, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1997, p.5. 
6   Jean-Luc Dehaene, speech to the European Institute, March 1995. Ann Mettler 
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Economically, the United States laid the groundwork for major free trade 
initiatives with Asia (APEC) and Latin America (NAFTA and the Free 
Trade Agreement of the Americas), which Europe took as further evidence 
of the United States' loss of interest in the old world. US foreign policy ap-
peared to be monopolized by events in Somalia, Haiti, Iraq, Bosnia and the 
looming financial crisis in Mexico. At the same time, the outcome of the 
1994 midterm election and the subsequent Republican Revolution threat-
ened to catapult the country into isolationism and unilateralism. 
With a common foreign policy still in an embryonic state, Europe proved 
unable to effectively cope with the crisis in Bosnia and also failed to au-
thoritatively guide the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in their dif-
ficult transition to democracy, much to the frustration of the United States, 
which had explicitly asked Europe to take primary responsibility in both 
tasks.
7 When talks began on the Transatlantic Agenda, both Europe and the 
United States were hopeful that such an agreement might enhance the Un-
ion's weak foreign policy profile.
8 
Despite initial doubts about it becoming a reality, the eventual prospect of 
European Economic and Monetary Union further compelled the United 
States to exert influence on the continent. Aware that EMU would dramati-
cally challenge the hegemony of the US dollar – especially its status as the 
major foreign reserve currency
9 - it was of vital interest to the Americans to 
stay involved in the European integration process.
10 Additionally, the 
United States hoped that a cooperation agreement might be able to diffuse 
potential trade disputes with its most important trading partner. 
 
7   Barry Eichengreen, “Transatlantic Economic Relations at the End of the 20th Cen-
tury”, American Studies, Vol. 42, No. 1/1997.  
8   Horst Krenzler and Astrid Schomaker, “A New Transatlantic Agenda”,  European 
Foreign Affairs Review, 1:9, Sep 1996, p.12. 
9   Jaques Santer, “The European Agenda: Preparing for the Next Millennium”, Speech 
at the Economic Strategy Institute, May 5, 1998. See also Klaus Friedrich, “Conse-
quences of EMU for Europe”, testimony before the US House of Representatives, 
Committee of Banking and Financial Services, May 1998).  
10  Ernst-Otto Czempiel, "Europa und die Atlantische Gemeinschaft," in  Aus Politik 
und Zeitgeschichte, B1-299, Januar 1999, p.13. The New Transatlantic Agenda and Joint Action Plan 
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Once the need for a more comprehensive cooperation initiative had been 
agreed upon, the debates began over which form an agreement might take. 
Some, such as President Jacques Santer argued for a comprehensive trans-
atlantic treaty, a proposal which was quickly dismissed because of the lack 
of true European political cooperation within the CFSP framework.
11 How-
ever, there was consensus on both sides that the successor agreement of the 
Transatlantic Declaration needed to contain more concrete commitments to 
joint actions. Likewise, it was supposed to nurture a European political 
identity and at the same time ease the financial burden of the United States 
in her role as global leader.  
An even more ambitious proposal was put forward by the British and Ger-
man Foreign Ministers, Rifkind and Kinkel, US Secretary of Commerce 
Brown and the Speaker of the H ouse of Representatives, Gingrich, who 
planned to establish a transatlantic free trade area (TAFTA). The initiative 
quickly ran into vehement opposition, however, and was criticized by the 
newly established World Trade Organization (WTO) because a free trade 
zone between the world's largest economies was thought to negatively im-
pact and distort the multilateral trading system.
12 Another obvious concern, 
which was most prominently voiced by France, was that TAFTA could 
pose a challenge to the sensitive area of EU agricultural subsidies.
13 
Although less comprehensive than some might have preferred, the New 
Transatlantic Agenda was a clear improvement over its predecessor b e-
cause it set the stage for transatlantic relations to finally move from consul-
tation to joint action. 
 
11  Ernst-Otto Czempiel, "Hat die euro-atlantische Gemeinschaft eine Zukunft?",  Blät-
ter für deutsche und internationale Politik, May 1998, p.25. 
12  Horst Siebert, Rolf J. Langhammer, Daniel Piazolo, "The Transatlantic Free Trade 
Area,"  Journal of World Trade, May 1995, p.59. See also Ernest H. Preeg, "Policy 
Forum: Transatlantic Free Trade",  The Washington Quarterly, Volume 19, No. 2, 
1996, p.105. 
13  See “France blocks bid for EU-US marketplace”, Financial Times, 28 April 1998. Ann Mettler 
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1995: Paradigm Change? The New Transatlantic 
Agenda 
The New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) and the Joint Action Plan (JAP) are 
two distinct, yet interdependent, documents which are designed to mutually 
reinforce one another. Whereas the former consists of general statements 
about the afore-mentioned priority areas, the latter lays out approximately 
150 precise initiatives to be undertaken in pursuit of these goals.  
While the NTA as a document is visionary and forward-looking, it also 
pays tribute to the long-standing linkage between the peoples on both sides 
of the Atlantic, and commemorates the extraordinary achievements of their 
cooperation: 
  For over fifty years, the transatlantic partnership has been 
the leading force for peace and prosperity for ourselves and 
for the world. T ogether, we helped transform adversaries 
into allies and dictatorships into democracies. Together, we 
built institutions and patterns of cooperation that ensured 
our security and economic strength. These are  epic 
achievements.
14 [emphasis added] 
  The fact that the remainder of the Agenda refrains from using such convoluted 
language and instead concentrates on genuine policy initiatives might be taken 
as another indicator of the new pragmatism in transatlantic affairs. 
  In essence, the NTA underlines a common strategic vision for Europe's 
security  - reiterating the imperative role that NATO has, and will continue to 
play, in the European security structure -, and also emphasizes the transatlantic 
economic partnership. In their role as the largest trade and investment partners 
in the world, the United States and the EU furthermore commit to promoting 
global free trade and creating a "New Transatlantic Market Place". The Joint 
Action Plan is regularly "updated" to respond to new political and economic 
developments and articulates the specific initiatives which accompany the po-
litical objectives of the NTA, the most important of which include, inter alia: 
 
14  European Union/Council, The New Transatlantic Agenda, Document 12353/95,         
Brussels, December 1995. The New Transatlantic Agenda and Joint Action Plan 
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Promoting Peace and Stability 
a)  Peace and Reconstruction in the former Yugoslavia 
In the midst of the Bosnia crisis, it was obvious that utmost priority was given 
to the implementation of the Dayton Accords and the reconstruction of former 
Yugoslavia. In comparison to past initiatives under the Transatlantic Declara-
tion, the JAP outlined actual policy responses and specific initiatives, such as a 
framework for "free and fair elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina" and "respect 
[for] the work of the War Crime Tribunal...in order to ensure international 
criminal accountability." Fearing the potential spread of the conflict, the two 
will attempt to stabilize the Balkan region at large, for instance through the 
Southeast Europe Cooperation Initiative (SECI), and the Royaumont process of 
Stability and Good Neighborliness in Southeastern Europe.
15 
b)  Central and Eastern Europe 
A second priority for the United States and the European Union was to as-
sist the integration of the newly emerging democracies of Central and East-
ern Europe into international political and economic institutions. Agreeing 
to a nnual high-level consultations, both sides underlined their pronounced 
interest in preparing the region for eventual membership in NATO and the 
European Union. In an attempt to consolidate democratic rule in the region, 
the US and the EU granted fifty awards of $20,000 each to non-
governmental organizations, distinguished persons and communities to 
honor their achievements in protecting human rights, supporting good gov-
ernance, and developing civil society.
16 
c)  Russia, Ukraine and the other New Independent States (NIS) 
In comparison to the ambitious plans for CEE, the transatlantic partners 
restricted their effort in this section to help Russia, Ukraine and other NIS 
 
15  Senior Level Group Report to the U.S.-EU Summit, December 1996. 
16  Fact Sheet released at the U.S.-European Union Summit in Washington, December 
1997. Ann Mettler 
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integrate into the global economy (not institutions). Given that these coun-
tries still have  a long way to go before they will be competitive in the 
global economy, assistance is targeted at the most pressing requisites, such 
as tax and banking-sector reform, privatization and post-privatization a c-
tivities, and small and m edium-sized enterprise development. In 1998, the 
partners decided to give special consideration in this category to the 
Ukraine by working jointly on projects of civil society, energy reform, and 
specific trade issues. Additionally, it was agreed to ensure the safety of the 
nuclear reactors at Chernobyl. 
d)  Promoting the Middle East Peace Process 
In this area, the transatlantic partners promise their support for the Middle 
East Peace Process, as well as the Palestinian self-government and eco-
nomic development, by implementing the c onclusions of the Casablanca 
and Amman Economic Summits. Also, the US and the EU promise large 
assistance programs which are made contingent on progress in the peace 
negotiations. To stimulate economic growth and promote greater regional 
interdependence, b oth will work towards free trade agreements between 
Israel, Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinian Authority, and also attempt to end 
the Arab boycott of Israel. 
e)  Closer cooperation of humanitarian assistance 
Given the scarce financial resources which flow into development cooperation, 
the two sides promise to coordinate their assistance programs in order to make 
them more effective. Also, in an attempt to avoid wasteful overlap, both will 
consider joint missions whenever possible, for instance in Northern Iraq, Libe-
ria and Angola, and hold early consultations on security in refugee camps as 
well as on the use of military assets in humanitarian actions. The JAP also calls 
for 'regular and intensified' contacts between US mission and Commission 
Delegations to supervise the coordination effort. The New Transatlantic Agenda and Joint Action Plan 
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(II) Responding to Global Challenges 
a)  Fight against organized crime, terrorism and drug trafficking 
Targeted primarily at the still volatile countries of the NIS and CEE, this sec-
tion seeks to enhance bilateral cooperation and institutional contacts. Yet, its 
implicit aim is also to achieve greater levels of cooperation amongst EU mem-
ber states. As previously elaborated, crime and drug trafficking presently still 
fall under third pillar collaborations, which is likely to impede progress on this 
part of the Agenda in the future. One success which may be attributed to this 
endeavor, however, is the promotion of the rule of law in former Eastern Bloc 
countries, for instance through international training programs at regional insti-
tutions such as the International Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest, the 
Italian Judicial Training Center, and the Middle and East European Police 
Academy.  
b)  Preservation of the environment 
This section of the Agenda and Action Plan calls for intensified bilateral con-
sultations on the environment and closer coordination in international negotia-
tions on the environment. In contrast to the previous section, this area is politi-
cally less controversial, and one may conclude that the prospect for 
transatlantic cooperation is good. Indeed, even very difficult issues, such as 
Russian nuclear safety, have been tackled, for instance by creating a strategy to 
deal with submarine and ice-breaker spent fuel and waste. In doing so, Ameri-
can and EU experts have been meeting with their Russian counterparts and ne-
gotiated an action plan for the most urgent waste problems. Also, New Re-
gional Environmental Centers (NREC's) will be opened in Russia, Ukraine, 
Moldova and Georgia, and will be modeled after the first NREC in Budapest. 
c)  Health 
As a matter not subject to third pillar restrictions, cooperation falling under this 
category has produced solid results, for instance the creation of a health task 
force which agreed to exchange data on communicable diseases (i.e. f ood-
borne diseases). In addition, the group plans to identify surveillance and r e-Ann Mettler 
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sponse capacities, review research approaches and training, and work closely 
with the World Health Organization. With regard to the latter, it was agreed to 
encourage the follow-up of its resolutions dealing with outbreak and reporting 
responsibilities and to strengthen response centers. 
(III)  Contributing to the Expansion of World Trade and 
Closer Economic Relations 
a)  Strengthening the multilateral trading system 
One priority in this category is the strengthening of the WTO by helping the 
organization to enforce multilateral rules and commitments, and secure full 
implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements by all its members. Sec-
ondly, both sides agree to work towards a further liberalization of financial 
services on a global basis, a comprehensive framework guiding government 
procurement procedures and intellectual property rights. Recognizing the long-
standing and tremendously successful transatlantic economic relationship, this 
area of cooperation - while not without occasional controversy - makes intui-
tive sense. Not only does the European Commission have the authority to rep-
resent the Union in virtually all trade-related matters (and is consequently not 
impeded by member states jealously guarding their sovereignty), but both also 
share a vital interest in opening up new markets. 
b)  Establishment of a New Transatlantic Marketplace (NTM)  
Agreed upon after the TAFTA initiative had been dismissed, the New Transat-
lantic Marketplace had the goal to deepen the existing economic relationship 
by harmonizing EU and US regulatory policies as much as possible. In particu-
lar, the partners pledged to undertake a joint study on ways to promote trade in 
goods and services, while at the s ame time work towards the reduction or 
elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers. The latter have greatly obstructed 
transatlantic trade and have resulted in intense efforts - and successful conclu-
sion  - of so-called Mutual Recognition and Information  Technology Agree-
ments (MRA's and ITA's respectively). The fact that the ITA alone will liberal-The New Transatlantic Agenda and Joint Action Plan 
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ize over $500 billion in trade  annually  is indicative of the magnitude of these 
agreements.
17   
c)  Jobs and growth 
Cooperation in this segment occurs primarily within the context of G-7 summit 
meetings and in consultation with the OECD and the International Labor Or-
ganization (ILO). Joint projects include increased investment in human r e-
sources, including education and skills training, and exploring the relationship 
between work and welfare. Against the backdrop of the information technology 
"revolution", both sides promised to work on the issue of employment and new 
technologies, while at the same time encourage entrepreneurship. With regards 
to economic growth, the results are less ambitious and are reduced to a mere 
"exchange of views on macroeconomic issues in the light of the importance of 
a sound economic framework".
18 
(IV)  Building Bridges Across the Atlantic 
a)  Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) 
By definition, the transatlantic economic partnership includes a multitude of 
private-sector actors. For that reason, it was agreed that section (III) should in-
corporate the active involvement of the business community. Within the 
framework of rotating chairmanships of participating companies, there are fif-
teen issue groups which produce specific recommendations, ranging from tax 
issues to export controls and investment/R&D to product liability. The TABD 
is a vivid example of the JAP's "hands-on", pragmatic approach, because it 
seeks the input of businesses in recognition of the fact that they are the most 
directly affected by the quality of transatlantic trade relations.  
 
17  Fact sheet released at the U.S.-European Union Summit in Washington, December 
1997. 
18  Joint U.S.-EU Action Plan, Council Document 12353/95, 1995. Ann Mettler 
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b)  Broadening science and technology cooperation 
While in the NTA both sides underline their commitment to promote greater 
scientific and technology cooperation, such an agreement only came about in 
1998. In principle similar to the cooperation in humanitarian assistance, both 
sides base their collaboration on the attempt to achieve greater efficiency and 
reduce costs. Specific projects in this segment include intermodal transport and 
fast transshipment techniques, intelligent transportation systems and the study 
of environmental health and the effects of radiation. 
c)  People-to-people links 
As the title indicates, this segment is addressed to non-governmental actors and 
institutions - youth, students, professionals, think tanks, etc. - with the aim of 
"deepening grassroots support for the transatlantic relationship". Educational 
exchanges for instance are based on the U.S.-EU Agreement on Cooperation in 
Education and Vocational Training. The people-to-people link is also being 
extended to the peoples of CEE, Russia, Ukraine, other NIS and Mongolia, 
which will receive assistance in reforming their higher education systems 
through the EU's TEMPUS program. 
The sheer spectrum of joint activities, as enumerated above, impressively de-
picts the ambitious goals of the NTA. Unlike previous agreements, emphasis is 
on specific projects, not the abstract and at times utopian endeavors of the past. 
Clearly defined tasks and an unequivocal "command structure" previously not 
in place created, at least in principle, conducive conditions for the successful 
implementation of the JAP. The next section will analyze the NTA's track re-
cord and explore the underlying reasons for its performance. 
NTA/JAP Progress Report 
President Santer called it a "first milestone in a new, deeper and more robust 
relationship between Europe and America," and US Secretary of Labor Her-
man described it as a tool which helps us "realize our common vision of strong 
and growing economies whose gains are shared by every working woman and 
man". Indeed, the NTA seemed to satisfy - even exceed - the expectations of The New Transatlantic Agenda and Joint Action Plan 
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policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic. Yet, a closer look at the actual 
achievements leads to a more sobering assessment: 
Section (I) 
Along with section (II), the goal of promoting democracy and fostering devel-
opment proved difficult to "operationalize". Severely impeded by the intergov-
ernmental structure and ill-developed foreign policy profile of the U nion
19, it 
was difficult to agree on joint actions, especially in light of the fact that the 
working methods and instruments used by each partner are quite different.
20 
While in principle, the two sides share a common goal, such as democracy or 
the rule of law, there are at times seemingly irreconcilable disagreements. A 
case in point is Iran. From the American point of view, Iran is a 'pariah state' 
which actively supports terrorism and seeks to build up nuclear capacity. Such 
a state, according to the American rationale, must be punished with political 
isolation and economic sanctions. For the Europeans, however, the best strat-
egy to deal with Iran is by way of 'constructive engagement', especially in light 
of the fact that the country is a regional power with vast oil reserves. In other 
words, Europe's pragmatic approach is perceived through American eyes as 
opportunistic because it places the sole burden of economic sanctions on 
American companies and gives their European counterparts an unfair advan-
tage. 
Cooperation of US and EU development and humanitarian assistance programs 
has proven more fruitful.
21 Less controversial in nature, both sides have begun 
to align their foreign aid budgets and embarked on a number of joint missions, 
for instance in Rwanda and Burundi. Also, they agreed to hold regular trilateral 
consultations with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. One of the great-
est and yet most challenging accomplishments has been the implementation of 
the Dayton Peace Accords. Assigning the administration of the city of Mostar 
 
19  See Dominic McGoldrick,  International Relations of the European Union, Long-
man, London, 1997, p.143. 
20  Bail et al., p.10. 
21  See Horst Krenzler and Gunnar Wiegand, “EU-US Relations: More than Trade Dis-
putes?”, European Foreign Affairs Review, spring 1999, p.23. Ann Mettler 
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to the EU has certainly helped Europe gain credibility as an international actor 
and has positively contributed to the further development of a foreign policy 
profile. 
Section (II) 
Progress in this section has been modest for the afore-mentioned reasons. A 
compounding factor has also been the sheer magnitude of the problems to be 
tackled. As in the previous section, it is evident that in order to solve problems 
of a  global dimension, it takes strong and decisive leadership. However, the 
Union has found itself in a paradoxical situation: on the one hand, it wants to 
escape the image of being an "economic giant and a political dwarf", on the 
other, it is hampered by the institutional structure (i.e. three-pillar system) it 
has imposed on itself. To better cope with these inherent contradictions, the US 
government has made a number of proposals in the fields of justice and home 
affairs which are of practical nature, in the hope that they will not be met with 
such controversy. These have included, for instance, an invitation to an EU 
delegation to visit the US Customs Service Intelligence Center near El Paso, 
Texas, to obtain information on how US colleagues help prevent car theft and 
control airport couriers and commercial cargo. Similarly unproblematic have 
been joint environmental initiatives. Dealt with extensively in EU fora, the en-
vironment is an area Europeans not only feel comfortable dealing with but in 
which they have also acquired a great deal of expertise. Consequently, Europe-
ans have taken a lead in the effort to coordinate positions in advance of future 
conferences on global environmental problems, such as climate change, and 
have initiated a joint project in the OECD aimed at reducing authorized levels 
of lead in fuel. 
The profound vulnerability that both the US and the EU experience with r e-
gards to the global challenges listed in section (II) should improve the pros-
pects for cooperation even in areas which are currently considered "off-limits". 
In other words, the potential benefits of acting jointly are likely to someday 
outweigh the cost of forfeiting sovereignty.  The New Transatlantic Agenda and Joint Action Plan 
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Section (III) 
The fact that the NTA has made economic cooperation its most comprehensive 
and ambitious chapter exemplifies a fundamental shift in transatlantic relations. 
While economics may not completely have driven security out of the sphere of 
"top priority" issues, in the post-Cold War world it is certainly on equal foot-
ing. That is why the disappointment ran deep when section (III) initially failed 
to produce the desired results. The Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRA's) 
in particular proved to be a contentious issue. More complex and problematic 
than had been anticipated, a MRA on telecommunications, information tech-
nology products, electrical safety, and electro-magnetic compatibility was i m-
peded by a dispute over whether the conclusion of agreements in these areas 
should be linked to the conclusion of agreements on pharmaceuticals and 
medical  devices. An MRA on pharmaceuticals is very difficult to achieve in 
the United States because the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) does not 
possess the legislative authority to delegate the certification of pharmaceutical 
products. 
Against the backdrop of these bureaucratic stumbling blocks, it was necessary 
for the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) to launch a concerted lobby-
ing effort on both sides of the Atlantic before a partial MRA was concluded in 
June 1997. The MRA covered six sectors, including medical devices, pharma-
ceuticals, recreational craft, telecommunications, and electrical equipment. 
This was a major breakthrough, affecting more than $47 billion of trade. In ac-
cordance with the TABD principle "approved once, accepted anywhere in the 
Transatlantic Marketplace", the MRA will eliminate duplicative testing, 
inspection and certification procedures, saving U.S. and European consumers 
and industry approximately $1.37 billion per year.
22 Overall, the TABD can 
look back on a solid track-record of achievements, best exemplified by the fact 
that of the 129 recommendations made between 1995-1998, over 50 percent 
have been implemented into law.
23 
 
22  Senior Level Group Report to U.S.-EU Summit, May 1997. 
23  Speech by Vice President Al Gore to the Transatlantic Business Dialogue Charlotte 
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  18
Despite these indisputable successes, the transatlantic economic partnership 
continues to be plagued by the infamous banana issue, and more recently also 
be the European boycott of US hormone-treated beef. The escalation over the 
latter - and the subsequent threat by the United States to impose penalty duties 
on goods valued at $900 million - has the potential to seriously disrupt transat-
lantic trade.
24 
Section (IV) 
The five areas of cooperation which were targeted under this chapter have 
greatly varied in their respective outcomes. Without a doubt, the TABD has 
been by far the most successful form of collaboration. Other projects, such as 
educational exchanges and a transatlantic labor dialogue, have yielded more 
modest results. More promising appears the in 1997 concluded Agreement on 
Science and Technology, which fosters links between research programs and 
institutes on both sides of the Atlantic. In a time of soaring government debts 
and notoriously under-funded cultural and educational exchange programs, 
section (IV) depends heavily on private contributions. With this in mind, it 
may seem as no coincidence that the TABD, with its support by some of the 
largest corporations on both sides of the Atlantic, exceeded even the most am-
bitious expectations. 
The Future of Transatlantic Relations? TABD-Style Co-
opertion 
Is the Transatlantic Business Dialogue a model for the future of U.S.-EU coop-
eration? Within the NTA, this section has been  - in conjunction with section 
(III) - by far the most effective form of joint action. What makes the TABD so 
unique is its bottom-up structure - or entrepreneurial diplomacy as it is at times 
referred to - which appeals to business leaders and policy makers on both sides 
of the Atlantic. The underlying motives for businesses are obvious: an oppor-
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tunity to communicate TABD recommendations to the highest levels of U.S. 
and EU officials, w ho can then develop effective policies with the ultimate 
goal of harmonizing the transatlantic market. 
The idea of a business-driven transatlantic dialogue was launched by the late 
U.S. Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown. Given that the U.S.-EU annual two-
way trade exceeded $300 billion, it became increasingly evident that traditional 
government-to-government communication was no longer enough. At the sug-
gestion of Secretary Brown, it was agreed that business leaders - as the practi-
tioners of international commerce  - should be consulted in the policy-making 
process. 
The first TABD conference took place in Seville, Spain, under the Spanish 
Council Presidency in November 1995, shortly before the NTA was concluded. 
A unique aspect of the TABD is its annually rotating chairmanship, which is 
held by CEO-level executives on both sides of the Atlantic. Despite initial 
doubts about receiving a positive response by the policy making community, 
the TABD participants were willing to allocate a great deal of financial and 
management resources to make the conference a success. The joint document 
contained over seventy recommendations on practical ways to reduce impedi-
ments to trade, many of which were incorporated into the NTA and the JAP.
25 
An integral part of the TABD is a f ollow-up and monitoring strategy which 
keeps track of its recommendations and maintains relations to policy makers. 
However, the TABD is not meant to be an end in and of itself. That is why the 
business community has informally agreed to continue the TABD  dialogue 
only as long as governments continue to be receptive to their initiatives. For 
the time being, however, it does not seem that the TABD is in danger of run-
ning out of new ideas to make the Transatlantic Marketplace a reality. To the 
contrary, as confirmed by the U.S. Acting Undersecretary of Commerce for 
International Trade, Timothy J. Hauser, "virtually every market-opening move 
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undertaken by the United States and the EU in the last couple of years has been 
suggested by the TABD."
26 
New initiatives  include an Information Technology Agreement II, which is 
primarily targeted at electronic commerce and standards to advance regulation 
harmonization. For instance, President Clinton proposed that the internet be-
come a free trade zone and called on governments to resist efforts that require 
technical standards for the internet or use technical standards as non-tariff bar-
riers.
27 Another project in the works is a second generation of Mutual Recogni-
tion Agreements. An MRA II would expand the MRA scope to include other 
important products and sectors not covered in the first phase, for example 
chemicals and biotechnology products. An MRA II would also deepen agree-
ments for the first products covered in MRA I.
28 
If the TABD continues to successfully push its economic agenda forward, it 
will only be a matter of time until the Transatlantic Marketplace becomes a re-
ality. However, as previously stated, trade conflicts are looming over the trans-
atlantic horizon, and there are a number of other issues which could potentially 
disrupt the cooperation effort. Will after all the very problems surface which 
were predicted to obstruct the future of transatlantic relations after the Cold 
War? 
Paradigm Lost? The Future of the NTA/JAP 
The American Point of View 
...the United States suffers from schizophrenia on the interna-
tional front. On the one hand, it claims that Europe...should as-
sert greater international responsibility and "share the burdens 
of leadership." On the other hand, its revealed preference is to 
 
26  Congressional testimony by U.S. Acting Undersecretary of Commerce for Interna-
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try to maintain American dominance  - even while asking oth-
ers to pay the bill  - and to exploit national differences within 
Europe whenever possible. 
Fred Bergsten in America and Europe: Clash of the Titans 
The European Point of View 
...we, in the European Union, must build on these harsh les-
sons - notably by making our own foreign and defense policy 
apt for the 21
st Century role that the EU must play. We can no 
longer accept having a foreign and security policy that is a 
clapped out relic of gone-by years...its like pigeon communica-
tions in the age of the Internet. 
Speech by Jacques Santer, former President of the European 
Commission 
Political/Security Cooperation 
The generation change of policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic - best ex-
emplified by President Clinton, Prime Minister Blair and Chancellor Schröder - 
may unfavorably affect transatlantic relations because these politicians do not 
share the traumatic experience of a World War and cannot build on long-
standing friendships and networks. Indeed, there has been a noticeable alienation 
between American and European political elites. Increasingly, Americans are 
complaining about having to pave the way and pay the bills for their European 
partners. They accuse Europe of a free-rider mentality and are reluctant to ac-
cept  the claim that Europe is not yet ready to speak and act with one voice. 
Europeans, on the other hand, object to US unilateralism.
29 
In security-related matters, there has been a pronounced policy shift between the 
Clinton administration and its predecessors. The former has - in an unprece-
dented move - encouraged Europe to develop a common defense identity and, if 
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deemed necessary, engage in military missions without the participation of the 
United States. With the logistical support of NATO, Europe can now handle se-
curity issues via the Western European Union (WEU). Yet, despite US conces-
sions, any European military action would in effect still occur under the u m-
brella of NATO. In exchange, European NATO members agreed to "out-of-
area" missions - inconceivable before the collapse of communism. Critics now 
charge that the United States has won on both fronts: first, there will not be a 
true competition to NATO, secondly, NATO may now be used for military ac-
tions worldwide, and thereby further strengthen US hegemony.
30 Europeans feel 
as if the United States not only outmaneuvered them but also came across as 
generous and altruistic in doing so. On the other hand, when one considers that 
in the last fifteen years every US citizen spent as much as $16,000 on defense-
related  expenditures, compared to about $6,000 for every European, it may be-
come a bit more comprehensible why American policy makers usually insist on 
having the last word on security matters.
31 
Another contentious issue in transatlantic relations is how to deal with Turkey. 
A loyal ally of the United States in a region of strategic importance, there has 
been a great deal of pressure on the EU to open its doors to Turkish accession. 
For the foreseeable future, this initiative will not be met with approval. To the 
contrary, the EU has viewed the advance of the United States as an inappropriate 
interference in its internal affairs.
32 Potential conflict also lingers nearby, in the 
Near East and the Caspian Sea. Especially the latter area could lead to m ajor 
transatlantic confrontations over the production and transportation of its oil 
wealth. 
In the future, it seems imperative that Europe learns to speak with one voice on 
many of the above issues. By themselves the European states, even the large 
ones, are at b est regional players.
33 Should Europe wish to become a global 
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player  - and many believe with the introduction of the Euro this is no longer a 
choice  - the member states need to overcome national differences and learn to 
pull on the same string. 
Probably by far the most controversial issue in the recent history of transatlantic 
relations has been the U.S. claim to possess jurisdiction in perceived wrongdo-
ings in third countries, the so-called issue of extraterritoriality.
34 The accompa-
nying legislation, the Helms-Burton Act and the D'Amato Act (also referred to 
as ILSA) seek to punish companies doing business in Cuba and Iran/Libya re-
spectively. Since US businesses are prohibited from doing business in both 
countries, these sanctions are purposefully targeted at foreign companies in gen-
eral and European companies in particular. Yet, the truly disadvantaged in this 
transatlantic squabble are American companies which miss out on lucrative 
deals, particularly in Iran and Libya. The sentiment against Europe is unequivo-
cally clear in a remark made by US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright:  
I know there is a sense among some Europeans that the US is 
too inclined to act unilaterally and too quick to pull the sanc-
tions trigger…there is likewise a sense among some Ameri-
cans that too often, the US takes the heat for dealing with dif-
ficult issues while others take the contracts  – that our 
willingness to take responsibility for peace and security makes 
it easier for other to shirk theirs.
35 
Economic Cooperation 
Despite the success of section (III) of the NTA, there are serious issues to be 
dealt with between the United States and Europe, the most critical of which is 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Inevitably, the new currency, the Euro, 
will impact the "hegemony" of the US dollar and force the United States to de-
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crease its current account deficit.
36 The fact that economic theory has shown that 
monetary duopoly leads to more volatile market conditions than either monop-
oly or a number of competing currencies, present further grounds to be con-
cerned about the future of transatlantic relations.
37  
Today, the EU produces 31 percent of total world GDP and accounts for 20 per-
cent of world trade. When comparing the corresponding US figures, 27 percent 
and 18 percent respectively, it is obvious that Europe will be at least as powerful 
as her Atlantic partner. There are even signs that in its fundamentals Euroland is 
in the long-run in better economic shape than the US. For i nstance, it enjoys 
considerably larger trade flows and monetary reserves and also holds a stronger 
financial position as a creditor area - which is particularly noteworthy given that 
America's net foreign debt currently approaches $2 trillion.
38 
Enjoying economic superiority for several decades, this may be perceived as a 
threatening development by the United States. For this very reason, it is impera-
tive that Europe realizes that monetary union is not an apolitical and uncontro-
versial by-product of its integration process, and it better understand that EMU 
will dramatically curtail US economic predominance.
39 Additionally  - and in 
contrast to most Europeans  - Americans understand that monetary union will 
eventually lead not only to a comprehensive economic union but also to a full-
blown political union. And so for many, the real issue is how, and not if, Europe 
can live up to its new role as world power.
40  
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Despite the significant reduction in tariffs and non-tariff barriers, the Union con-
tinues to be a stronghold of "agro-protectionism".
41 US farm state Congressmen 
– prompted by reports that the EU will initiate new trade liberalization talks 
which do not include agriculture – recently introduced a bill in both houses of 
Congress which declared that “the elimination of restrictions…should be a top 
priority of any current or future trade negotiations between the US and the EU.
42 
Even a WTO ruling condemning the European banana regime was met with lit-
tle more than shoulder-shrugging.
43 In fact, in the US report on trade barriers, 
the European Union ranks right behind China. Lately, it seems that official dis-
course between the US and the EU has been hampered by what in the scheme of 
things are minor issues - like bananas or hormone-treated beef which together 
account for less than half a percent of overall trade - to the detriment of bilateral 
negotiations. Yet, European consumers for whom the issue of food safety is of 
vital concern have vehemently demanded that their interests not be compro-
mised for the sake of free trade.
44 It may thus come as no surprise that at their 
December summit, the two sides could not agree to more than new winemaking 
standards.
45 The tendency to get caught up in insignificant, bureaucratic details, 
is vividly illustrated by the former Head of the Delegation of the European 
Commission in Washington, DC: 
We [US and EU] have so many common interests and perspec-
tives, but our capacity to squabble over issues of almost no 
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importance is remarkable. Sometimes we're like two young 
toy.
46  
The fact that the EU - in stark contrast to the United States - consistently runs 
boys that have everything but end up fighting over a small sizable trade sur-
pluses may well trigger envy on the other side of the Atlantic. Quite understand-
able so if one considers that America's trade and current account deficits will 
probably hit $300 billion in 1999. Consequently, any slowdown in the US econ-
omy would almost inevitably trigger protectionist sentiments which could - be-
cause of the negative impact on key European industries - lead to a rapid dete-
rioration of US-EU relations.
47 The presidential election next year may yet 
compound the tension as candidates will likely try to blame Europe for running 
trade surpluses while doing little to stimulate its ailing economies at a time 
when recession-hit countries urgently need to increase their e xports. Already, 
presidential aspirant Al Gore has warned Europe that the United States “can-
not carry the burden alone…[we] cannot be the importer of last resort”.
48  
Institutional Imbalances 
The sui generis nature of the Union has over the years presented quite an enigma 
to US policy makers and diplomats because “sovereignty has been pooled in 
some areas but not in others…the balance between intergovernmentalism, feder-
alism and supranationalism is constantly evolving.”
49 Historically, the bilateral 
political relationship between the US and the European institutions has devel-
oped very slowly and has been of less intensity than that involving Washington 
and the major European governments.
50 Only recently have Americans begun to 
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realize that NATO’s role in the transatlantic arena will be second to the Union, 
that “today’s historic business revolves around the EU.”
51 
De facto, there are no institutions which have the exclusive mandate of serving 
the transatlantic community. While the NTA and JAP are certainly a step in the 
right direction, both documents purposefully refrained from creating an institu-
tion to facilitate the cooperation effort. Consequently, the quality of the transat-
lantic relationship is to a large extent susceptible to election outcomes and 
changing political elites. It is for instance a well known fact that the Clinton ad-
ministration has not been particularly fond of the “niceties of EU’s institutional 
arrangements” because they are associated with Europe’s inability to reach deci-
sions on some of the most pressing trade and investment issues.
52 Even more 
explicit, a prominent State Department aide has been known to call EU decision 
making a “disaster the US would never allow in NATO.”
53 
Undeniably, NATO was once a suitable forum for transatlantic consultations but 
in today's era of globalization it is impossible to address the most pressing issues 
via a security alliance and Cold War relict. In view of the fact that the transatlan-
tic economic relationship has come to play a much more prevalent role than it 
used to, it is indispensable that Europe and America devise new strategies and 
institutional arrangements to manage both their bilateral economic relations and 
global economic issues. An opportune forum may be the G-2, which some argue 
urgently needs to be reinvigorated.
54  
With the introduction of a common currency, the time has come - indeed is 
long overdue - to find an effective procedure to represent Europe/ Euroland 
in international organizations and financial councils. Despite the integration 
rhetoric, EU member states still push first and foremost their political  a-
genda and jealously defend their national prerogatives. This has led to 
much confusion with regard to who represents the Union e xternally: the 
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European Commission for instance has the exclusive mandate for dealing 
with most trade issues, but many other subject matters need also be addres-
sed with the member states, with the presidency rotating every six 
months.
55 As if this constellation was not sufficiently confusing, there are 
numerous exceptions to the Commission/Council rule, these being instan-
ces when either the presidency may act alone, or the troika and commission 
or all member states and commission. Against this backdrop, the recent ap-
pointment of Javier Solana as High Representative for Foreign and Security 
Affairs can only be seen as a step in the right direction.
56 However, even if 
the representation issue is tackled, the decision making structure remains a 
stumbling block, even after ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty. While in 
principle most decisions can now be reached by qualified majority, in prac-
tice the unwritten “consensus rule” is likely to prevail. If a country fears 
that it will be outvoted, it can threaten to block another – often unrelated – 
decision which does require unanimity. 
Conclusions 
The New Transatlantic Agenda and the Joint Action Plan helped solidify 
US-EU relations at a critical time in history. Today there is widespread 
consensus that the end of the Cold War has not only changed the former 
Eastern Bloc countries beyond measure but also fundamentally altered the 
dynamics of the transatlantic relationship. In a unipolar world – in which a 
common enemy no longer irrevocably ties both sides together – the Union 
has struggled to find its profile, whether it be in the political or economic 
sphere.  
When  – and the question no longer is “if” – the Euro transforms Europe 
into a world power, the transatlantic relationship will need to be adjusted to 
account for new realities. Europe will have to proactively push its agenda, 
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not only to keep up with its main ally, the US, but even more so because 
other global players are emerging, most notably China. 
The wars in former Yugoslavia have made it painfully obvious that Europe 
– even though immediately exposed to the horrific consequences of the 
conflict – was unable to act in unison and has lost a lot of credibility along 
the way. The NTA should be used by Europe as a platform to establish a 
global profile and finally escape the image of being a ‘soft power’ only.  
New reforms and institutions need to be developed if the problems which are 
contained in, and outside, of the NTA are to be tackled successfully. In other 
words, this is not a time to herald our achievements, but rather to get to work. 
After all, the “governments have been quite adept at declaring the launch of new 
transatlantic ‘dialogues’, ‘partnerships’ and ‘marketplaces’, but the fundamental 
problems still remain unresolved.”
57   
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